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Quantum key distribution protocols based on equiangular spherical codes are introduced and
their behavior under the intercept/resend attack investigated. Such protocols offer a greater range
of secure noise tolerance and speed options than protocols based on their cousins, the mutually-
unbiased bases, while also enabling the determination of the channel noise rate without the need
to sacrifice key bits. For fixed number of signal states in a given dimension, the spherical code
protocols offer Alice and Bob more noise tolerance at the price of slower key generation rates.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk, 03.67.-a
The possibility of secure key distribution using quantum
states is by now a well established feature of quantum
information theory. In the original 1984 proposal of Ben-
nett and Brassard (BB84) [1], four states of a spin-1/2
system, the eigenstates of σz and of σx, are used as sig-
nals by the sender Alice. These states are naturally par-
titioned into two orthonormal bases from which the re-
ceiver Bob chooses one at random to measure the signal.
Because the bases are unbiased—i.e., the overlap between
vectors from distinct bases is always the same, equal to
1/2 for qubits—Bob learns nothing when his measure-
ment doesn’t correspond to Alice’s preparation, but ev-
erything when it does. The nonorthogonality of all the
states allows Alice and Bob to detect eavesdropping by
an adversary Eve, so the states form an unconditionally
secure cryptographic protocol [2, 3, 4, 5].
One more unbiased basis, the eigenvectors of σy, can
be added to the BB84 set, forming a six-state proto-
col [6]. Unbiased bases can be found in higher dimen-
sions as well [7], and the key distribution protocol has
been extended to such cases, with increasing dimension
leading to improved security [8].
Here we introduce a new ensemble of signals, equiangu-
lar spherical codes, and show that key distribution prot-
cols based on them offer potential advantages over the
unbiased bases. Our security analysis is based on the
eavesdropper’s use of the intercept/resend attack and, as
such, doesn’t provide firm proofs of security, but rather
yields an insight into the workings and features of the
protocol. The first feature is simplicity. Such protocols
need not sacrifice potential key letters in order to estab-
lish the amount of information Eve has learned about the
whole key string. The success rate (sift rate) of the proto-
col itself furnishes this information. Second, equiangular
spherical codes offer a greater range of protocol security
and key generation speed options for fixed dimension.
Finally, for fixed number of signal states in a given di-
mension, these protocols offer a higher noise threshold
for secure operation but lower key generation rates than
do the mutually-unbiased bases.
Recall the general setting of quantum key distribution.
Two parties, Alice and Bob, wish to make use of an au-
thenticated public classical broadcast channel and an in-
secure quantum channel controlled by an adversary Eve
to establish a secret key for the purposes of encrypting
and sharing other data. They start by using the clas-
sical channel to fix a signal ensemble and a measure-
ment for the quantum channel. Alice sends states drawn
from the signal ensemble through the quantum channel to
Bob, who performs the chosen measurement (in the case
of signaling states drawn from mutually unbiased bases,
the several measurement bases Bob chooses from for his
measurement are here amalgamated into a single gener-
alized measurement). Eve is free to exploit knowledge
of the protocol and her control of the quantum channel
to mount an attack on their protocol; she can in princi-
ple subject the signal states to any physical interaction
that she wishes. Effectively, this process produces a se-
quence of samples from a certain tripartite probability
distribution shared between the three parties. Alice and
Bob then proceed to “distill” the key by communicat-
ing information based on their individual sequences over
the classical channel. Their goal is to exploit the quan-
tum nature of the channel to make Eve’s eavesdropping
ineffective.
The relevant probability distribution is the joint prob-
ability p(ai, bj , ek) of Alice’s signal, Bob’s measurement
result, and the result of whatever measurement Eve per-
forms in the course of eavesdropping. Repeated use of the
protocol yields a sequence of samples drawn from this dis-
tribution. Alice and Bob, however, must establish which
distribution they are sampling from, as it depends on
Eve’s attack. We imagine Eve has some physical setup
which can give rise to many different distributions as she
changes the strength of her interference with the chan-
nel. Given an assumption of the type of attack, Alice
and Bob determine the extent of Eve’s interference by
making public and comparing a fraction of the Alice’s
signals and Bob’s measurement results. In this way they
estimate the error rate of the channel, and together with
2an assumption of the attack, determine the distribution
p. From the remaining samples, which are supposed to
be an asympotically large number M , say, they can dis-
till a key of length MR in accordance with the following
bounds:
IE ≤ R ≤ I(A :B|E) , (1)
where I(X :Y ) = H(X) +H(Y )−H(XY ) is the mutual
information ofX and Y , H(·) being the Shannon entropy,
and IE = I(A :B) −min{I(A :E), I(B :E)}. The lower
bound obtains when the key is distilled using one-way
communication [9]; to progress beyond this requires a
technique called advantage distillation, though this is of
limited efficiency [10, 11].
These bounds provide a method of investigating the
cryptographic usefulness of a protocol. Given a signal
ensemble, Bob’s measurement, and an assumption about
the nature of Eve’s attack, the probability distribution
can be calculated, and the key rate bounds determined.
In this way the security of the protocol against this attack
is established. To say that a protocol is unconditionally
secure is to demonstrate its security against all possible
attacks.
The focus now turns to Alice’s signal ensemble and
Bob’s measurement. An intuitively appealing ensemble is
a spherical code, a complex-vector-space version of points
on a sphere whose minimal pairwise distance is maximal.
The complex version, called the Grassmann packing prob-
lem, asks for a set of unit vectors in Cd whose maximal
pairwise overlap is minimal [12]. When all these pair-
wise overlaps are equal, this equiangular spherical code is
called a Grassmann frame; i.e., a set C = {|φk〉 ∈ Cd}nk=1
for n≥d is a Grassmann frame if
|〈φj |φk〉|2 = n−d
d(n−1) ∀ j 6=k . (2)
Grassmann frames also arise as the solution to the
“minimum energy problem.” For a set of unit vectors
C, call Vt(C) =
∑
j,k |〈φj |φk〉|2t the t-th order “potential
energy” of the set of the vectors [13]. The minimum en-
ergy problem is to find C having n≥d elements such that
V1 = n
2/d and V2 is minimized. Note that n
2/d is the
global minimum of V1. This follows from considering the
(at most) d nonzero (real) eigenvalues γj of the Gram ma-
trix Gjk=〈φj |φk〉. Clearly
∑
k γk=n and
∑
k γ
2
k=V1(C).
These being the equations for a plane and a sphere, the
minimum of V1 occurs if and only if all the γk are equal to
n/d, whence V1 is bounded below by n
2/d. Thus what is
sought is the set of vectors with the minimum V2 energy,
given minimum V1 energy.
To find a lower bound for the minimum of V2, let λjk =
|〈φj |φk〉|2, and employ the same method again. We have
immediately that
∑
j 6=k λjk = V1 − n = n(n − d)/d and∑
j 6=k λ
2
jk = V2 − n, whence the minimum of V2 over all
sets minimizing V1 is bounded below by making all the
λjk the same and given by Eq. (2). When this lower
bound is achieved, i.e V2 = n
2(n− 2d+ d2)/(n− 1), the
result is a Grassman frame.
The existence of Grassmann frames isn’t established
for arbitrary n and d, though some general statements
can be made [14]. They always exist for n = d + 1 (a
regular simplex), but never when n > d 2. For n ≤ d 2,
when a Grassman frame exists, it is a spherical code, but
for n > d 2, spherical codes aren’t equiangular.
By minimizing V1, Grassmann frames automati-
cally form measurement POVMs, which can be used
by Bob to detect Alice’s signal. This is true be-
cause S =
∑
k |φk〉〈φk| = (n/d)I, so that a POVM
can be constructed from the subnormalized projectors
(d/n)|φk〉〈φk|. To see this, fix an orthonormal basis
{|ek〉} and consider the matrix Tjk = 〈ej |φk〉. The
Gram matrix can be written as Gjk = (T
†T )jk, while
Sjk = (TT
†)jk, so both have the same eigenvalues. When
V1 is minimized, these d eigenvalues are all n/d, implying
that the vectors form a resolution of the identity.
By using the same ensemble as Alice, Bob’s measure-
ment confirms the signal she sent with probability d/n.
Bob may also choose a measurement which attempts to
repudiate some of Alice’s signals, in a manner entirely
similar to unambiguous state discrimination [15]. Be-
cause the number of states is larger than the dimension
of the space on which they are supported, it is impossible
to unambiguously determine the signal Alice sent with
nonzero probability. However, for any ensemble, a pari-
tal determination may be made, a scheme which works
as follows. First, partition the signal ensemble into the
set of all subsets of size b. Then, for each subset, find
the projector orthogonal to the span of the vectors in the
subset. This procedure yields a measurement operator
for each of the subsets. In order to find an orthogonal
projector to the span, b must be restricted such that none
of the subsets spans more than d− 1 dimensions.
For general ensembles, the operators constructed by
this procedure do not quite form a measurement; some
additional “failure” outcome is required to make the en-
tire set form a resolution of identity. Interestingly, this
additional outcome appears not to be required when the
signal ensemble is an equiangular spherical code. Numer-
ical constructions starting with ESCs in modest dimen-
sions always yields a proper POVM in which no “failure”
outcome is necessary. Though both types of measure-
ments deserve further study, we shall specialize to the
case of confirmation protocols; repudiation protocols are
developed for qubits in [16].
Confirmation protocols are appealing because the ESC
ensembles are the sets that are “least classical” in the fol-
lowing sense [17]. Consider using these quantum states
as signals on a classical channel as follows. Instead of
sending the quantum state, Alice performs the associ-
ated measurement and communicates the result to Bob
using a classical channel. Bob then prepares the asso-
3ciated quantum state at his end. The fidelity of Bob’s
reconstruction with the input state, averaged over inputs
and measurement results, measures how well the classical
channel can be used to transmit quantum information.
This fidelity is dV2/n
2, so among all ensembles which
themselves form POVMs, Grassmann frames are hardest
to transmit “cheaply” in this way. Eavesdropping on the
communication between Alice and Bob makes the chan-
nel more classical—Eve is essentially trying to copy the
signal—so one might expect that Grassmann frames are
useful in foiling the eavesdropper.
Before examining their resistance to eavesdropping, we
remark on how Alice and Bob can concretely use the
equiangular spherical codes to accomplish secure key dis-
tribution. Though a protocol satisfying the lower bound
of equation 1 is guaranteed asymptotically, it may not be
feasible in practice. Consider first the case of a noiseless
quantum channel, i.e. no eavesdropping. In a length-N
string of samples Alice and Bob will agree with probabil-
ity d/n. When labelling the states 0 to n−1, Bob’s string
b is simply Alice’s string a plus a string δ having a fraction
(n−d)/n of non-zero elements. Alice can select a classi-
cal error-correcting code C which can correct these errors,
choose a codeword c randomly, and send a+c to Bob. He
then simply subtracts this from his string to obtain c+δ,
from which he uses the error-correcting property to deter-
mine the codeword c. From the Shannon noisy-channel
coding theorem, there are roughly NI(A :B) codewords,
in accordance with the lower bound.
When Eve has no information about the quantum sig-
nals, the communicated string a + c tells her nothing
about c, since it’s effectively encrypted by a. Should Eve
have some information about a, gleaned from her tam-
pering with the quantum channel, Alice and Bob may
proceed as before to establish c, and then use a privacy
amplification procedure to shorten this string and remove
any information Eve has about it.
As formulated, this protocol is not particularly robust;
Alice and Bob can do better by first announcing some of
the signals not received, a procedure analagous to sifting
in the case of mutually unbiased bases. Upon receipt
of each signal, Bob publicly broadcasts m outcomes he
did not obtain. If Alice’s signal is among these, they
throw it away and proceed to the next. For the signals
which pass the test Alice and Bob relabel the remaining
states in order from 0 to n−m− 1 and follow the above
procedure. This occurs with probability m/(n − 1) as
Bob could send any of
(
n−1
m
)
outcomes and
(
n−2
m−1
)
of these
contain Alice’s signal. The protocol itself succeeds with
probability
psift =
n(n−1)−m(n−d)
n(n−1) =
s
n(n−1) , (3)
where we have implicitly defined the constant s. Mean-
while, the key rate when using an n-word equiangular
spherical code in d dimensions excluding m outcomes is
given by
R = log[n−m] + d(n−1)
s
log[d(n−1)]
+
(
1− d(n−1)
s
)
log[n−d]− log s. (4)
The real question is how well the protocol tolerates at-
tempted eavesdropping. To begin formulating an answer
it is useful to consider the intercept/resend attack. Be-
cause it is straightforward to analyze, it offers immediate
insight into the usefulness of these protocols. A full treat-
ment of the problem could involve Alice and Bob using
quantum error-correcting codes to turn a noisy quantum
channel into a smaller, noiseless channel. However, this
is far too complicated for the first step in this analysis.
In the intercept/resend attack we assume that Eve fixes
a fraction q of signals to intercept. She measures those
so chosen using the same equiangular spherical code as
does Bob, resending him the output of this process. Eve
simply guesses Alice’s signal to be her outcome, unless
it is excluded by Bob’s announcement. In this case she
may still guess, but retains the information that she was
forced to do so.
By delineating the various cases, it is uncomplicated
to arive at the relevant quantities. First, the sift rate of
the protocol depends on q as in the following expression.
Letting t = s(n − 1) − qm(n − d)(d − 1), the sift rate is
now
psift = t/n(n−1)2. (5)
Alice and Bob’s joint probability distribution is deter-
mined by the agreeement probability
pa=b = (n−1)(d(n−1)−q(n−d)(d−1))/t. (6)
Since Alice and Bob use the same ESC ensemble, Eve’s
joint probability with Alice is the same as with Bob. In
order to account for the cases in which Eve measures the
signal but this outcome is later excluded by the protocol,
we may append an event to her probability distribution,
denoted by ?. Now she has n−m+1 total outcomes, and
the ? outcome functions as a guess as to the key letter
in the cases it occurs. The joint probability of such an
exclusion and the particular signal j is plainly the same
for all j, and together with the probability of agreement
between Alice and Eve, these quantities fully describe the
overall distribution:
pa=e = qd(n−1)s/nt, (7)
p? = 1− qs2/nt. (8)
These quantities enable us to compute the lower bound
on the optimal key rate in equation 1. Then we may de-
termine the value of q such that R = 0, and from this the
maximum tolerable error rate for a given n,m, d combi-
nation. Finally, we can convert this error rate into the
4corresponding channel depolarizing rate for the purposes
of comparison with unbiased bases protocols. Consider-
ing the error rate alone is misleading since for a noise-
less channel Alice and Bob expect no errors, post sifting,
when using unbiased bases, but do expect some errors
when using the spherical codes. Better protocols remain
secure at higher channel noise rates, and we pick the de-
polarizing channel for simplicity. For the spherical codes
the depolarizing rate r is related to the error probability
pe = 1− pa=b via the expression
r =
s
m(d−1)
− n(n−1)(n−m−1)
m(d−1)(n−1 +m(pe−1)) (9)
For protocols using unbiased bases these expressions
are much simpler; in fact it is easier to work with the
mutual information expressions themselves. For a given
probability of error between Alice and Bob, their shared
information is simply the full amount less the corruption
caused by the error:
I(A :B) = log d+ pe log pe + (1− pe) log(1− pe)/(d− 1)
(10)
Eve gains information only if she measures in the correct
basis, and the basis announcement step prevents her from
incorrectly guessing Alice’s signal. Thus she gains the
full information log d if she manages to measure in the
correct basis. Letting k be the number of bases, this
makes Eve’s information q/k log d. The probability of
error is (k−1)(d−1)/kd, so in terms of error probability,
Eve’s mutual information is
I(A :E) =
d
(d−1)(k−1) pe log d (11)
The sift rate of the protocol is always the probability
1/k for Bob to measure in the same basis Alice prepared
the state, regardless of Eve’s interference. Finally, the
equivalent depolarizing rate r for a given error rate pe is
simply r = ped/(d−1).
Now we can compare the various aspects of both proto-
cols. The first difference comes from the sift rate. When
using unbiased bases, the protocol will fail with prob-
ability (k−1)/k no matter how noisy the channel. To
determine the error rate, Alice and Bob must announce
some of their created key letters so as to compare how of-
ten they agree. Obviously these letters cannot be used in
the key so they are sacrificed. However, for equiangular
spherical codes the sift rate depends on the intercept rate.
Successful execution of the protocol relies on the correla-
tion between Bob’s outcome and Alice’s signal, thus the
probability of successful sifting decreases as the noise in-
creases. Further, Eve can’t replace the signals with any
others to increase the sift rate and attempt to mask her
intervention on other signals, for she would need to know
Alice’s signal. Thus, there is no need to sacrfice key let-
ters in order to estimate Eve’s information.
The second immediate difference is the increased num-
ber of possible protocols using the equiangular spheri-
cal codes. With unbiased bases Alice and Bob have the
choice of using anywhere from 2 to (possibly) d+1 bases.
Spherical codes offer more possibilities, as n may range
from d+1 to d2 and m from 0 to n−2. This offers two
advantages. The first is speed. In particular there are
protocols involving fewer than 2d signals, the minimum
for the unbiased bases. This translates into higher abso-
lute key generation rates, the key generation rate times
the sift rate. Suppose Alice and Bob use n = αd spheri-
cal code states. Then the maximum key generation rate
becomes log(d)/α + (α−1)/α log((α−1)/α) for large d,
in contrast to at best log(d)/2 for unbiased bases. By
choosing α < 2 Alice and Bob can find spherical codes
which are faster than two unbiased bases. For example,
consider 35 spherical code states in 25 dimensions. The
key rate is roughly 3.4 bits per signal as compared to 2.3
for two unbiased bases.
The second advantage is security. Increasing m is sim-
ilar to increasing the number of unbiased bases in that
both lead to decreased key rate and increased maximum
tolerable noise. For maximum security Bob may elect to
announce all but two of the outcomes he didn’t obtain,
whereas for maximum speed Bob would choose m = 0.
Figure 1 shows the maximum tolerable noise rate for two
values of m, as a function of number of signal states in
ten dimensions. The corresponding maximum error rate
when using various numbers of unbiased bases is included
for comparison. The case of m = n− 2 always yields an
improved secure noise threshold over unbiased bases.
These two advantages hold when considering all pos-
sible ESC protocols in a fixed dimension and so are ap-
propriate if only the dimension is constrained by the par-
ticular hardware Alice and Bob wish to use. However, a
direct comparison of the two protocols involves a tradeoff
between speed and security for a fixed number of states
in a given dimension. When using spherical code proto-
cols, Alice and Bob are free to choose m to match the
perceived error rate in the channel, so for each style of
signal ensemble, fixing n and d specifies a concrete phys-
ical setup with similar resources. For each protocol we
may consider the pair consisting of maximum key genera-
tion rate and the maximum tolerable error rate. Plotting
the pairs for protocols having n signals in various dimen-
sions we can determine the tradeoff for the two protocols.
Figure 2 reveals that for n = 2d signals, the spherical
code protocols offer more security (larger vertical values)
but at the price of slower key generation (smaller hori-
zontal values).
Use of spherical codes has been applied here to a spe-
cific model of quantum key distribution. However, they
are immediately applicable to two variants of the “pre-
pare & measure” protocol discussed here. First is the co-
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FIG. 1: Maximum tolerable noise rate in the depolarizing
channel as a function of number of elements in the equian-
gular spherical code (n) and mutually-unbiased bases (kd)
ensembles, each in d = 10 dimensions. Two ESC protocols
are shown, above and below the MUB protocol. The upper
curve corresponds to the maximal security case m = n − 2
in which Bob excludes all but two outcomes, while the lower
corresponds to m = n/2, exclusion of half the outcomes. The
flexibility in number of elements n and number of ourcomes
publicly excluded m provides an increased level of security
over the unbiased bases.
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FIG. 2: Speed/security pairs for ESC and MUB protocols
using n = 2d signals. Each point represents the maximum
key generation rate (horizontal axis) and maximum tolerable
noise rate for the depolarizing channel (vertical axis) for that
particular protocol. The three lines connect corresponding
protocols between the two different signal ensembles and show
that while the unbiased bases are faster for fixed n and d, the
spherical codes are more robust.
herent version of such protocols in which Alice prepares
a bipartite state, ostensibly entangled, and sends half to
Bob. Each party then measures his or her half, returning
the protocol to the original picture. This method al-
lows us to bring not only classical but quantum informa-
tion processing tools to bear on the problem of security.
Equiangular spherical codes fit nicely into this frame-
work, as they can always be realized from maximally en-
tangled states. Thus they start on the same footing as
unbiased bases, for which this is also true. To demon-
strate this, consider a spherical code C = {|φk〉} and a
“conjugate” code C∗ = {|φ∗k〉} formed by complex conju-
gating each code state in the standard basis. Then it is
a simple matter to show that |Φ〉 = (√d/n)∑k |φk〉|φ∗k〉
is maximally entangled. Thus if Alice prepares this state
and sends the second half to Bob, they can realize the
“prepare-and-measure” scheme by measurement.
Second, the full array of d2 equiangular states is a
tomographically-complete ensemble, like the full comple-
ment of d+1 unbiased bases [14]. Such sets are useful in a
modified protocol in which Eve, instead of Alice, creates
bipartite states and distributes one half to each of the
two parties [18], and as a test to ensure secret key gener-
ation is possible [19]. Now Alice and Bob need to perform
quantum state tomography on their pieces to ensure the
security of the protocol. Using the d2 equiangular states
again offers more security in this case.
Investigating the intercept/resend attack yields an in-
sight into how the spherical codes ultimately perform
in comparison with unbiased bases, when the strongest
eavesdropping attacks are considered. The spherical
codes’ flexibility in n and m leads to advantages in both
speed and security, though not together in any one in-
stance, all the while rendering unnecessary the proce-
dure of sacrificing key letters to determine the error rate.
For fixed resources, i.e. fixed number of states in a
given dimension, spherical codes offer higher noise se-
curity thresholds, but slower key generation rates.
This hindrance may be possible to overcome, or at least
ameliorate, for Bob’s use of Alice’s spherical code is al-
most certainly not his best choice. That is, assuming that
the secrecy capacity will increase with increasing classical
capacity of the quantum channel, Bob’s optimal measure-
ment is likely not the spherical code used by Alice. This
is evident in two dimensions for the two spherical codes,
which we may think of in the Bloch-sphere representa-
tion as a regular tetrahedron and three equally-spaced
coplanar vectors. By inverting each vector in the ensem-
ble the resulting combination of spherical code encoder
and inverse spherical code decoder achieves a higher clas-
sical capacity. In the case of the trine this is known to
be the optimal measurement [20] and conjectured to be
for the tetrahedron [21]. These are in fact the two qubit
protocols based on the repudiation measurement alluded
to earlier. Much the same is true in three dimensions, at
least for the case of six equiangular states: an unenlight-
ening numerical maximization produced the result that
a unitarily-transformed version of the encoding spher-
ical code yields a capacity of 0.638, a roughly 50% im-
provement over the nominal capacity of 0.424 when using
the same ensemble for encoding and decoding. An even
greater classical capacity can be achieved by using a re-
pudiation measurement, each outcome of which excludes
two possible signal states. In this case the capacity jumps
to 0.734. Neither of these strategies surpass the capacity
6generated by using two unbiased bases, log[3]/2 ≈ 0.792,
but they narrow the gap.
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